As the world's only Jewish state--Jewish both by design and population--Israel presents a unique set of questions to students of religion and politics. How large a role does Judaism play in the politics of contemporary Israel? How does the political system balance the imperatives of The breadth of questions precludes definitive answers in a single chapter. Indeed, entire volumes have been devoted to each of the questions raised in the preceding paragraph (Abramov 1976; Dowty 1998; Liebman and Don-Yehiya 1984) . Rather than attempt to cover the full range of issues raised by Israel's Jewishness, a strategy that would permit me only to scratch the surface, this chapter instead explores only a small number of themes. The central focus linking the questions is Israel's identification as a Jewish state. That is the quality that sets Israel apart from the other nations covered in this volume and, indeed, the trait that distinguishes Israel from all other states that have existed in the modern world. Following a brief overview of Israel's religious heritage and the position of its non-Jewish inhabitants, the chapter focuses on the two major political cleavages that incorporate a religious dimension--relations between religious and secular Israeli Jews and the tension between religious nationalists and the advocates of territorial compromise. Even with such a limited focus, the chapter will raise more questions than it resolves.
Was Israel established by King David or Theodore Herzl?
--Bishara Azmi (1997) As the world's only Jewish state--Jewish both by design and population--Israel presents a unique set of questions to students of religion and politics. How large a role does Judaism play in the politics of contemporary Israel? How does the political system balance the imperatives of Jewish law and the demands of governing a modern state? How are conflicts between religious groups moderated? In what ways does Judaism influence the nature and conduct of political life? Does Judaism reinforce or undermine the maintenance of a democratic regime? Do the distinctive qualities of Judaism promote a different style of politics from that associated with states dominated by Christian or Muslim populations? How does the fact of Jewish dominance influence the treatment of non-Jewish minorities who live in the state? How are Jewish religious groups themselves influenced by the character of the state?
The breadth of questions precludes definitive answers in a single chapter. Indeed, entire volumes have been devoted to each of the questions raised in the preceding paragraph (Abramov 1976; Dowty 1998; Liebman and Don-Yehiya 1984) . Rather than attempt to cover the full range of issues raised by Israel's Jewishness, a strategy that would permit me only to scratch the surface, this chapter instead explores only a small number of themes. The central focus linking the questions is Israel's identification as a Jewish state. That is the quality that sets Israel apart from the other nations covered in this volume and, indeed, the trait that distinguishes Israel from all other states that have existed in the modern world. Following a brief overview of Israel's religious heritage and the position of its non-Jewish inhabitants, the chapter focuses on the two major political cleavages that incorporate a religious dimension--relations between religious and secular Israeli Jews and the tension between religious nationalists and the advocates of territorial compromise. Even with such a limited focus, the chapter will raise more questions than it resolves.
Background
Along with the United States and Russia, Israel is one of the three major population centers of world Jewry (Cashman 1995) . More than 80% of Israel's approximately 5.5 million citizens are adherents of Judaism (Central Bureau of Statistics 1998). Surveys suggest that about 20% of Israeli Jews are highly observant, another 20% are wholly non-observant, and the remaining 60%, usually described as "traditional," follow a mix of religious and secular customs. modern nation is the embodiment of a much older impulse. The area known today as Israel was part of the ancient homeland of the Jewish people until they were expelled by the Romans in 66 A.D. During the long period of exile that followed, Jews continued to look to this land as their home and prayers for a return to Jerusalem were incorporated into the liturgy of Sabbath worship. In one sense, the Jewish people never accepted their banishment as a permanent condition but as an "unnatural" exile to be ended when God restored them to their rightful home in Zion. In the interim, however, the Jews spread across the globe and established durable diaspora communities in many regions. The longing for Zion did not disappear over the centuries but, like the appearance of the Messiah, was postponed until the dim and distant future. Though some Jews made their way back to the ancient homeland, living as aliens under foreign rulers, most lived and died elsewhere. By the early nineteenth century, Jews could be found virtually everywhere but the major centers of Jewish settlement were in Asia (the Arab Middle East), northern Africa and eastern Europe. The conditions of these Jewish communities varied widely depending on the attitude of local rulers and the extent of religious tolerance.
What we might call theological Zionism, the identification of Jerusalem as the lodestar of Jewish civilization, trusted to God to bring about the end of exile. The longing for a return to the ancient homeland took more concrete shape in the late nineteenth century movement known as political Zionism, founded by Theodore Herzl. The Zionist movement called for immediate reestablishment of a Jewish homeland in the Middle East and, in the interim before that goal could be recognized, promoted the immigration of Jews to the area then known as Palestine. The appearance of Zionism at that time was the product of complex forces--the contagious growth of nationalism among minority groups, the prevalence of virulent anti-Semitism in many "enlightened" states, the continuing misery of Jews in areas that had not yet transcended feudal conditions, and the erosion of Jewish identity in places where assimilation had become possible.. Together, these conditions fueled the expansion of Zionism until the goal of creating a Jewish state in the Middle East was formally endorsed by Great Britain in the 1917 Balfour Declaration.
Stimulated by Zionism, Jews made their way to Palestine by hook or by crook throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, settling in cities and the country-side, building up a functioning Jewish community with a wide range of social, cultural, religious and political institutions, and developing a modern Hebrew language (Horowitz and Lissak 1978) . To the indigenous Arab population of Palestine, predominantly a village society, the large-scale Jewish immigration from Europe represented an alien intrusion and was resisted with both active and passive means. Following years of political maneuvering, furious diplomatic efforts, the horrors of the Nazi holocaust in Europe, and open confrontation with the British authorities who ruled Palestine from 1918-1947, the creation of a new Jewish homeland was finally approved by the United Nations in 1948. At the moment of independence, the new state was home to perhaps 650,000 Jews and an estimated 700,000 Arabs. The events that followed independence dramatically enhanced the Jewish character of the Israeli population. In a savage war with the surrounding Arab nations whose armies had invaded the infant Israeli state, most Arab residents of Palestine fled or were expelled beyond the borders of Israel. The approximately six thousand Jews killed in the fighting were soon replaced by the immigration of most of what remained of European Jewry after the Holocaust. At the same time, as the rising tide of Arab nationalism in the Middle East and North Africa made life extremely uncomfortable for the large Jewish communities in those areas, most of the population left en masse for Israel. New communist regimes in Eastern Europe completed the work of the Holocaust by driving out most of their surviving Jewish communities who also fled to Israel. Just six years after independence, then, the population had returned to prewar levels but the Jewish share had climbed to around 90% (Mahler 1990, 38) . Although the remaining Arab population within Israel grew steadily due to high levels of fertility, Jewish predominance was reinforced over the following decades by additional waves of immigrants from around the globe. 4 As late as the 1980s and 1990s, Israel continued to draw large cohorts of Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union and its successor states and, in a series of dramatic airlifts amidst the chaos of civil war, to transplant to Israel virtually the entire ancient Jewish community of Ethiopia.
If measured solely by the sheer force of numbers, then, Israel is a state of the Jews. But to Zionists, Israel's Jewishness was not incidental but its very purpose. Israel was conceived as a haven for Jews, a sanctuary where they could escape the ever-present threat of persecution that had accompanied life in exile. In the proclamation of independence issued on May 15,1948, the founders declared Israel's central purpose to "open the gates of the homeland wide to every Jew and confer upon the Jewish people the status of a fully privileged member of the community of nations." The massacre of millions of European Jews in the Holocaust had made that task even more urgent.
Defined in that way, it is clear that Judaism occupies a special place in Israeli political culture and it is fair to say that it has achieved the status of a de facto established religion. Describing Judaism as the "de facto" established religion recognizes that it is privileged in ways that make Jews more than first among equals. Apart from defining the very purpose of the state, Judaism supplies the state with its dominant language of Hebrew, its weekly and annual calendar, and many of its state ceremonies, symbols and traditions. In an otherwise open political system, Israel bars ballot access to political parties that deny the Zionist character of the state. Israeli citizenship is available to non-Jews but Jews are favored by immigration policy and in terms of many social benefits. But Israel's proclamation of independence also promised "freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture," pledged to "ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion," and committed to "safeguard the Holy Places of all religions." As a parliamentary democracy rather than a theocracy, Israel does in fact provide the free and unfettered religious worship guaranteed by its Independence proclamation. Israeli citizenship is not limited to Jews Perpetuating the "millet" system inherited from Ottoman rule and maintained by the British during their period of sovereignty, the modern Israeli state provides public funding for the religious needs of non-Jewish communities, permits them to choose their legally-mandated day of rest, leaves questions of family law to the religious courts of each religious tradition, and allocates money for educational institutions under Christian and Moslem control. The same electoral regulations that bar antiZionist parties also deny legal recognition to movements that promote racial or religious incitement against minorities. Given these qualities, Israel does not promote theocracy, the fusion of religion and state found in Iran, nor the rigid separation between the two domains as in the secular state established in the U.S. Like most democratic states, Israel follows a middle way between these extremes (Monsma and Soper 1997) .
Because of the substantial autonomy granted to minority--meaning non-Jewish--religious communities, religious freedom is not a significant factor in the ongoing conflict between Jews and Arabs. This does not mean that religion is absent from the conflict. Indeed, the verbal battle between the two sides is laced with religious language, symbols, and imagery (Shipler 1986 ). Jewish Israelis often attribute Arab hostility not to pragmatism or nationalism but to a deep-seated anti-Semitism rooted in centuries of religious conflict between Islam and Judaism. Much of the hostility of the Arab nations toward Israel is in fact expressed as opposition to its "Zionist" character. That sentiment sometimes leads to calls for "jihad" or a holy war to excise the "cancer" of a Jewish state from the Moslem Middle East. Among Palestinians, the term favored by Arab residents of Israel and the refugees who left during the War of Independence, religious themes may also be invoked in public discourse. 5 The most violent wing of Palestinian nationalism, the Hamas organization, portrays itself as a grass-roots Muslim movement and recruits its terrorists with explicitly religious appeals. Nonetheless, I would argue, the root of Arab-Jewish tension is conflict over land and self-determination, resources that are only incidentally related to religion. To the Palestinian community, the paramount issue has been the loss of territory and sovereignty that accompanied Jewish migration to Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish state. For Arabs outside Palestine, Israel was detested as "a bridgehead planted in their midst by Western powers determined to keep Arabs divided and to frustrate their national ambitions" (Shlaim 1995, 25) . One should not mistake the idiom of the conflict--religious language, symbols, and imagery--for the substance of the conflict. There is more than enough religiously-based political conflict in Israel without having to impose that framework on what is essentially a nationalist struggle!
Religion as a Political Force
Among Israeli Jews, the vast majority of the population in the state of Israel, religion has increasingly emerged as a source of division and struggle. Such a claim may seem bizarre given the widespread tendency to assume that common religious identity promotes national cohesion. If religion bequeaths to people a sense that their fates are linked, forged in the "primordial" mists of time and reinforced constantly by common experience and interaction, then surely a shared religion should enhance the development of a sense of peoplehood (Gutmann 1979, 31) . True enough for most religions, these assumption would seem to hold even more strongly for Jews. After all, Judaism was long thought to be the glue that held the Jewish people together during their centuries of exile and it remains the agent that binds the dispersed Jewish people to the state of Israel. Nonetheless, while it may promote national integration on some levels, religion also has the capacity to divide people into competing camps. In contemporary Israel, Judaism has increasingly played a divisive role.
In the first of Israeli Judaism's two major fractures, the division runs between an ultra-Orthodox minority and the less observant sectors of the Jewish population. The power of this tension indicates the unresolved nature of the Zionist debate over whether Israel was to be a Jewish state or a state of the Jews. Some observers regard this line of cleavage as the major domestic challenge to the survival of the state (Chafets 1996) . The other form of intra-Jewish conflict, the second cleavage examined in this chapter, is built upon the aspirations of Israel's religious Zionists, a community embedded primarily within the realm of modern Jewish orthodoxy. In a sense, this division represents the other side of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict because it too constitutes a form of territorial nationalism. Less known outside Israel than the religious-secular debate, this particular line of conflict poses the most potent long-term threat to the stability and viability of the Israeli polity.
The Theocratic Challenge of UltraOrthodoxy
Some years ago, when I asked an Israel friend why he planned to move from his comfortable home in a Jerusalem suburb, he told me that he was leaving because "the blacks" were moving into the neighborhood. The shock must have registered on my face because my friend quickly added that he was not referring to Israelis of African origin but rather to the community of religious Jews whose men dress in black hats and coats. This community, known variously as the Ultraorthodox or haredim, is the offshoot of a 18th century revivalist movement that swept across Jewish settlements in Eastern Europe. 6 The descendants and converts to this movement are now found around the world but approximately half of them live in Israel where they are estimated to constitute about 10% of the entire Jewish population and half of the "religious" population (Heilman 1992, 12) . In an attempt to minimize contact with other communities, they cluster in dense "urban villages" where the streets "throb with pious Jews in black garb, bearded, bespectacled, chattering in Yiddish, tumultuous, in a hurry, scented with the heavy aroma" of Eastern European cuisine (Oz 1983, 3) . In religious practice, the Ultraorthodox are known for maintaining the strictest standards of religious observance and for refusing to make accommodations to secular society. Although the use of the term is controversial, they are sometimes described as "fundamentalist" and equated with similar "extreme" wings of Islam, Christianity and Buddhism. Like fundamentalist movements elsewhere, they are notoriously schismatic and organized in rival sects that often bear only slightly less hostility to one another than they do toward the secular culture of modernity.
7 Despite the powerful differences between various wings of the Ultraorthodox movement, this discussion focuses on their shared traits.
Israel poses a theological problem for the Ultraorthodox (Ravitzky 1996, ch. 4) . Owing to a history of disastrous episodes led by false Messiahs, Jewish tradition had long warned against attempting to bring a Jewish state into being by the actions of humanity. That was God's task. In addition to the sin of trying to "hasten redemption," Ultraorthodoxy charged Zionism with heresy for claiming to have created a Jewish state without a foundation in Torah, the Jewish sacred tradition. For the haredim, Israel will deserve to be considered a "Jewish state" only when the government enforces the 624 Biblical prescriptions that collectively make up the core of "halacha" or Jewish law. This theocratic option was explicitly rejected by the Zionist founders of Israel who were steeped in European socialism and known for their irreligion if not anti-religious sentiments.
The leaders of the new state nonetheless pledged to the Ultraorthodox that Israel would maintain what has become known as the "Status Quo" regarding religion (Shimshoni 1982, 478) . Under this agreement, the state would maintain a Jewish character in several respects. Jews would be accorded their traditional day of rest on Saturday, Jewish dietary laws would be followed in the kitchens of all state institutions, and the state would fund a religious school system to which observant parents could send their children. The religious affairs of the Jewish community were entrusted to a chief rabbinate with authority to fund local religious services, control Jewish holy places, certify dietary practices in the food industry, and maintain legal control over all aspects of Jewish personal status--marriage, divorce, adoption, burial, conversion, etc. Jewish men engaged in full-time religious study were exempted from military service and observant women were either exempted or given the option of alternative national service. The enforcement of religious custom, such as the prohibition upon labor and motorized transport on Saturdays, was to be contingent upon the religious composition of local communities. This produced the strange norm that public transport would run at full strength on the Sabbath in largely secular Haifa, operate in reduced mode in the more religiously-mixed area of Tel Aviv, and remain at a standstill in Jerusalem, the holiest city to observant Jews. In an even finer gradation within cities, the state would close roads in religious neighborhoods on the Sabbath while permitting traffic elsewhere.
These concessions were not made to placate a powerful enemy. At the time of statehood, Israel was home to a mere ten thousand Haredim, less than 2% of the population. Indeed, it was probably the weakness of this community that inspired the secular David Ben-Gurion to guarantee the Jewish character of the state. Ben Gurion and many of the founding Zionists saw Ultraorthodoxy as doomed by modernity and unlikely to pose a long-term problem for the emerging Israeli state. Under these conditions, a generous policy toward Ultraorthodoxy would secure the community's allegiance to the state at small cost. The Status Quo would permit devout Jews to participate in the life of the nation without seriously disadvantaging the non-Orthodox majority. Although there were tensions and conflicts over the content of Status Quo in the early years, the policy largely held. The Ultraorthodox acquiesced in the state, withholding their deepest affection but nonetheless participating to the extent of paying taxes, obeying the law, and confining their demands to such apparently peripheral issues as prohibiting autopsies, archaeological digs that disturbed Jewish graves, Sabbath desecration, and other practices that insulted Judaism. Ben Gurion's prophecies of Ultraorthodox extinction proved to be spectacularly off the mark. Far from contracting, the haredim grew at a rapid pace as their population was augmented by extremely high rates of fertility, immigration of traditionalist communities, and the development of an Ultraorthodox subcommunity among Israel's large population of Sephardic Jews from the Arab states of the Middle East and North Africa. The current estimates put the Haredi population of Israel between 250 and 300 thousand, a number equivalent to 10% of the Jewish population and half of the religious sector. The largest concentrations are still found in Jerusalem, where the Ultraorthodox are nearing majority status, and in certain Tel Aviv suburbs but the Ultraorthodox have spread out to formerly secular areas in towns, cities and rural areas. Wherever they live, the haredim continue to form enclaves that are defended against the larger culture. The change in numbers has been accompanied by a change in culture and lifestyle. What was once something of a folk religion, relying on informal transmission of tradition and custom, has become highly institutionalized. Leadership has passed from rabbis and community elders to Torah scholars who head the great and influential academies of Jewish learning known as yeshivot (singular yeshivah). Although these islands of traditionalism still venerate faith over science, they have appropriated many modern forms of technology such as computers, the VCR, and tape recorders as tools to spread the message of traditionalism.
The numerical success of the Haredim has also been underwritten by the generous financial subsidies provided under the Status Quo policy. The relative handful of Torah scholars whom Ben Gurion casually exempted from conscription have swollen into an army of nearly thirty thousand full-time Yeshivah students (Hirschberg 1998, 10) . Many are thought to be registered in name only so they can draw state grants while simultaneously holding down "secular" employment. In addition to exemptions, they receive stipends worth several times the funding allocated to university students. Ultraorthodox women have largely foresworn the national service envisioned as an alternative to compulsory military enlistment. The web of institutions controlled by the Ultraorthodox, vast networks of day care centers, state religious schools, adult care facilities, language training classes, etc., also draw state subsidies valued at $250 million per year (Halevi 1992, 7) . These benefits are jealously guarded by the Ultraorthodox political parties that emerged as major players in the 1980s. Once content to entrust their representation to others, the haredim now vote at high levels, serve in government ministries, and extract financial rewards for supporting governing coalitions. In the current Knesset, for example, Haredi parties hold fourteen of the sixty-one seats commanded by the governing majority and fill nearly one-fourth of executive positions in the Netanyahu administration. By threatening to withdraw support, they have an effective veto power over many government decisions.
Numbers and political power may have encouraged the haredim to assert their claims more boldly. In terms of public policy, their spokesmen now clamor for the state to be more fastidious in its Jewish character. Claiming that God will delay redemption as retaliation for the sins of Jews, they demand, among other priorities, that the state severely restrict abortion, cease all transportation on Sabbath and holidays (including flights by the Jewish airline, El Al), ban the growth or importation of non-kosher meat, impose severe standards of modesty on public displays, and use their control over certificates of kashrut (signifying compliance with kosher dietary practices) to impose other forms of religious observance on hotels, restaurants and other public places. They remain insistent that the chief rabbinate, increasingly Ultraorthodox in tone, maintain sole authority over marriage, divorce, burial and other matters of personal status. They refuse to allow the other streams of Judaism--the non-Orthodox varieties that are preponderant in the diaspora--any form of legal recognition. They have called on the state to limit immigration to Jews who conform to the classic halachic definition, permitting entry to only those non-Jewish dependents and relatives who convert to Judaism under orthodox auspices. In well-publicized incidents, Ultraorthodox crusades have sometimes utilized violence, riots, civil disobedience and other forms of disruptive behavior. Within their enclaves, for example, extremists have burned down newsstands that sell "secular" publications, disrupted public worship services by non-orthodox groups, beaten women who appear immodestly clothed in public, and stoned private automobiles that drove near haredi neighborhoods on the Sabbath.
Outside their own community, the haredim are a controversial and often despised sector of Israeli society. Survey data from 1991 show that they tied for last among nine groups whom the public was asked to rate on a scale running from "very positive" to "very negative" (Levy, Levinsohn and Katz 1993, B-12) . The Haredim were assigned a positive ranking by 41% of Israeli Jews, a figure that it easier to interpret when one recognizes that exactly the same percentage of Israeli Jews responded positively to Arabs! The enmity has several sources. Israelis who serve in the military, spend long years in the reserve, and pay some of the highest taxes in the world often denounce the haredim as parasites who consume but do not produce. Secular Israelis are particularly infuriated by the willingness of the haredim to draw benefits from a society that they so openly and provocatively disdain. On Israeli holidays celebrating national independence, for example, the news media routinely carry stories about ritual burnings of the Israeli flag on the streets of Ultraorthodox enclaves and broadcast pictures of ordinary Haredim going about their business while the rest of Israel observes a solemn moment of silence as a tribute to those who fell in battle. Despite these provocative images, one should not exaggerate the tension between secular and religious Israeli Jews. Many Israelis outside the religious sector grudgingly respect the Ultraorthodox for their fidelity to tradition and veneration of Jewish learning. Even Jews who dislike the messenger of traditional Judaism believe the state should retain a Jewish character and do not personally suffer from many of the Status Quo provisions enacted to placate the haredim. Indeed, substantial majorities endorse such Status Quo policies as kosher kitchens in public institutions, closing roads in religious neighborhoods on the Sabbath, and maintaining the prohibition on civil marriage. But the Israeli public is equally strongly committed to ending what it sees as Ultraorthodox privilege by requiring all young men and women to perform military service and to accord equal public status to non-Orthodox streams of Judaism (Levy, Levinsohn and Katz 1993) .
For their part, the Haredim have a very different image of their goals and aspirations. Far from picturing their community as a juggernaut out to impose theocracy, they regard their community as small, vulnerable and besieged ("'Black' Power" 1990). With so many men outside the workforce and women confined to jobs that pay low wages, they find a constant struggle to feed, clothe and house their large families. The Ultraorthodox life is difficult to sustain in the face of modernity as the allures of contemporary civilization--materialism and sensuality--seem constantly poised to invade the insular precincts of traditional Judaism. Far from consuming resources to which they are not entitled, the Ultraorthodox spokesmen contend, they generally receive from the state far less in services and subsidies than they contribute by taxation. On the vexing question of military service, the haredim point to the difficulty of reconciling the demands of Ultraorthodox observance and military service and the special dangers this could pose for unworldly young women. In less practical terms, they argue that Israel is defended both by its soldiers and by God who appreciates the religious fidelity of yeshivah students. On the larger criticism of their anti-Zionism, the haredim insist they are more sinned against than sinners. They point to a strain of virulent anti-Orthodoxy in Zionism, accusing the Israeli "veterans" (Socialist pioneers) of showing contempt toward the religious immigrants who arrived after statehood and continuing to show their disregard for sacred Jewish traditions by going to the beach rather than fasting on the Day of Atonement. Haredi spokesmen justify their refusal to celebrate Israeli holidays or participate in public mourning for fallen soldiers by claiming that such ceremonies are not part of the Jewish tradition.
For all their growth and power, the Haredim remain a small subpopulation whose power has been exercised on issues that are not central to Israeli political debate. The maintenance of Orthodox authority on religious matters, a subject of strong feelings in the Diaspora, is less salient to Israelis because most were raised in Arab states or Eastern Europe where non-Orthodox Judaism was simply unknown. Where issues do impinge on the prerogatives of the non-Orthodox majority, they are often resolved by granting symbolic victories to the haredim but negotiating accommodations that retain the status quo (Don-Yehiya 1986; Sharkansky 1996) . The Israeli national airline may have been grounded on the Sabbath at the insistence of the Haredi political parties but landing rights could be reallocated to foreign airlines, preserving travel opportunities on Saturday. The no traffic zone might be enlarged around Ultraorthodox islands on the Sabbath but alternative roads could be built to funnel secular travelers to the stores, bars, restaurants and other public entertainments that have expanded operating hours on the weekend. Jews who want to marry or non-Jews who wish to convert outside the Orthodox rabbinate can do so abroad and the state will recognize these actions. If all else fails and the demands of the Ultraorthodox cannot be accommodated, the Ultraorthodox political parties usually prove more concerned with maintaining state subsidies for their institutions than in forcing secular Israelis or the state into a halachic mode. On these occasions, they may be persuaded to forego their religious objective in exchange for additional state funding.
Territorial Nationalism and the Modern Orthodox
Thus in sum, the conflict between the Ultraorthodox and other Israelis seldom touches on vital questions that might endanger the preservation of the state. That is not the case for the other major intra-Jewish cleavage to which we now turn our attention, the conflict over territorial nationalism.
Since the Six Day War of 1967, when Israel acquired huge new tracts of land via military conquest from its attackers, the Israeli public has been polarized about what to do with the new territory. In the first stages of victory, when there was hope for a reconciliation with the Arab states, the Labor Government treated the lands as bargaining chips to be exchanged for peace treaties. The failure of the Arab states to play along led to a hardening of Israeli attitudes, helping stimulate a political movement that regarded the territories as vital to Israeli security in the next war. Ten years after the War, the Likud Party came to power on a platform of territorial maximalism. Unlike Labor which had signaled a willingness to exchange land for peace, Likud took the position that Israel had the right to maintain those territories located in the ancient Hebrew kingdoms of the Middle East. That issue continues to define the principal axis of political conflict in contemporary Israel.
To a considerable degree, the Modern Orthodox community has provided the core constituency for territorial nationalism (Peres 1995, 104) . The community of Modern Orthodoxy constitutes about 10% of the Jewish population of Israel and makes up half of the religious sector. Like their Ultraorthodox contemporaries, the Modern Orthodox community is defined religiously by its professed adherence to the commandments enshrined in halacha. As the adjective suggests, this segment of the religious sector differs from the Ultraorthodox in having made peace with many aspects of contemporary society. Because they are committed to living in greater harmony with modern culture rather than resisting it at all costs, Modern Orthodoxy does not insist on segregating itself in virtual ghettos. The Modern Orthodox attempt to follow Jewish law but to do so while participating fully in society. Except for the cloth head coverings worn by men and the longer skirts of women, adherents of this religious tradition do not differ much in appearance from non-religious Israelis. Although they usually attend different schools and participate in different youth groups, the Modern Orthodox often share with their secular counterparts a lifestyle that incorporates respect for secular education, commitment to material comfort, and openness to Western traditions in music, theater and art. They converse in modern Hebrew rather than the Yiddish still favored by many of the Ultraorthodox.
This commitment to social integration is not accidental but part of the historical context that produced this stream of contemporary Jewry. The ancestors of today's Modern Orthodox are the Religious Zionists who embraced both Judaism and Zionism in the late 19th century and who worked with the socialist advocates of a Jewish state (Luz 1988) . They stood apart from the mass of Ultraorthodox who, as previously noted, rejected Zionism both because it arrogated the task of redemption to humankind and because its most passionate advocates were non-religious socialists. Yet the Religious Zionists parted company with their socialist fellow-travelers by insisting that the new Jewish state must carve out an important role for religious institutions and values. The partnership could be justified because the religious authorities of the community argued that antireligious Zionists were inadvertently doing the holy work of God even as they fulminated against traditional Judaism (Ravitzsky 1996, ch. 3) . Because what they shared was more significant than their differences, the Religious Zionists managed to work relatively peacefully with secular Zionists in laying the foundations for modern Israel They did so by creating a set of religious institutions--labor unions, schools, banks, youth groups--that paralleled the "official" Zionist entities but retained an express commitment to traditional Judaism.
Because they were Zionists, the Modern Orthodox enthusiastically embraced the Jewish state that emerged in 1948. From the beginning, they served in the military and participated fully in the responsibilities of citizenship. While the haredim withdrew from even the religious stream of state education and trusted their own rabbis over the State Rabbinate which was "tainted" due to its complicity with Zionism, the Modern Orthodox put their stamp of approval on the "official" religious institutions of Israel. The Modern Orthodox also participated in the Israeli political process, giving much of their support to the National Religious Party (NRP). The party was not reluctant to join the governing coalition and usually supported Labor's foreign policy line. Owing to the Ultraorthodox boycott on serving in official positions, the Modern Orthodox were quick to seize control of the various religious ministries and funneled state resources through their own institutions. In matters of religion and state, they largely accepted the Status Quo. Although they usually sided with the Ultraorthodox when religion and state collided, the Modern Orthodox seldom initiated these conflicts. Until the Six Day War, the Religious Zionists were probably the strongest evidence for the integrationist role of Judaism in Israeli society.
Of all the sectors in Israeli society, the Modern Orthodox were the most affected by Israel's stunning military success in 1967. In the months before the war, as Arab leaders spoke openly of driving Israel into the sea and Holocaust memories were rekindled, Israel's plight seemed desperate. The decisive victories over the Arab armies, the conquest of parts of the ancient holy land, the reunification of Jerusalem under Israeli authority--all these events seemed not simply remarkable but divinely ordained. A movement that can perhaps best be described as revivalist swept over the some of the leading Orthodox yeshivot (Don-Yehiya 1996) . To the enthusiasts of this movement, Israel's miraculous success indicated that the redemption of the world was at hand. The victory was taken as a sign that God intended the Jews to reclaim all of their original homeland. The best way to hasten the Messianic age was to re-enact the original Zionist mission by settling the land--in this case, the land that Israel acquired by military means in 1967. The Modern Orthodox were the leaders of the initial movement to settle in what Israel called the administered territories (Lustick 1988; Sprinzak 1991, ch. 5) . At first, the settlements were dictated by strategic considerations and the Labor Government understood them to be beachheads chosen to defend Israel proper. But for the most enthusiastic of the settlers, mere questions of strategic advantage were secondary to the larger task of reclaiming Israel's patrimony. The Religious Zionist movement began a systematic campaign to plant settlements in holy areas whether or not the Government approved. When Likud came to power in 1977, it enthusiastically embraced the settlement cause and provided generous subsidies to encourage further activity.
The secular parties that dominated rival governments may have assumed they were using the settlers for their own purposes, Labor to frighten Arab states into peace negotiations, Likud to so colonize the territories that they could never be returned in the event of peace negotiations. But both parties failed to understand the religious passion that fueled the settlement movement. Eventually, these differences produced a significant gulf between the settlers and the major parties. Labor's professed willingness to return the captured lands in the event of peace obviously put the Religious Zionists at odds with the dovish Labor Party. But even Likud, which shared the Land of Israel vision, eventually found itself at odds with Religious Zionism. Concerned principally with questions of security, the Likud's goal was to preserve the additional territorial buffer provided by the West Bank, formerly controlled by Jordan, and the Golan Heights of the north, taken from Syria in fierce fighting. The Gaza Strip and Egypt's Sinai Desert, Israel's other conquests in 1967, were of lesser value because they provided minimal military benefits. When Egypt's Anwar Sadat made clear his willingness to offer peace terms to Israel in the 1970s, Likud seized the opportunity provided by the Camp David Agreement to remove one of Israel's most dangerous enemies from the strategic equation. Sadat's price included return of the Sinai and the evacuation of the Israeli settlements planted there. Although Likud acquiesced, the religious settlers in particular were bitterly disappointed that a party sharing its philosophy of territorial nationalism should so callously expel Jews from their ancient homeland. In the eyes of some of the religious settlers, Likud's "betrayal" took on cosmic dimensions because it so obviously violated the will of God (Sprinzak 1991, ch. 4) .
The opposition to the Camp David Agreements by many Religious Zionists illustrated the degree to which the movement, once part of the mainstream Zionist consensus, had moved to the extremes of the Israeli political spectrum. That position was maintained over the years as the settler movement became the major opponent of Israeli concessions on matters of Palestinian autonomy or sovereignty. Even among Religious Zionists who did not settle in the West Bank--the vast majority of the community--its retention became part and parcel of what Charles Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yehiya (1983) described as a new Israeli civil religion. In this faith, replete with symbols, holidays, mechanisms of socialization and other aspects of a distinctive religious faith, the land itself acquired sacred status. Land was not merely the means to an end--security for the Jews, a haven, an opportunity for "normal" existence--but rather an end in itself. To return the land to 'foreign control" was not merely bad policy but a betrayal of God's will.
The debate over the land polarized Israeli public life. Although heated ideological rhetoric was not new to Israel and was indulged in by partisans on both sides, critics suggested that religious sentiment inflamed the advocates of territorial nationalism. The traditional distrust of Gentiles fused with Biblical imagery to produce an portrait of Israel's Arab antagonists that deemphasized their humanity. In a particularly vicious example of this stereotyping, the Palestinians were portrayed as a modern incarnation of the Amelekites, sworn enemies of the ancient Hebrew tribes whom the Bible had commanded Jews to exterminate. 8 The negative imagery extended beyond the Palestinians, who were in fact competitors for land, to those Israeli Jews who most ardently spoke out in favor of Palestinian rights and territorial compromise. Because most "doves" were grounded in Western liberal values, invoking human rights, civil liberties and democracy, they too were portrayed as apologists for a perspective alien to traditional Judaism. "In the eyes of the orthodox," wrote Israel's most distinguished anthropologist, "the positions of the doves and hawks are associated with diffuse cultural differences. It is part of the great clash between those faithful to the heritage of Jewry on the one hand, and the rootless on the other hand, between 'Guardians of the Torah' and detractors of the Torah, between goodness and corruption" (Deshen 1995, 118) . This style of religiously-informed discourse, treating one side of a political debate as the fount of virtue and the opposition as an incarnation of the devil, often leads to brutality.
Fueled by these visions, the extreme wings of Religious Zionism eventually gave way to acts of violence and savagery. A Jewish Terror Underground emerged on the West Bank, assassinating Arab political leaders and carrying out bombing attacks on buses carrying Arab passengers. An observant Jew and respected physician in the Territories, Baruch Goldstein, reacted to the murder of a friend by a Palestinian with a murderous onslaught of his own, machine-gunning to death more than 30 Muslims as they prayed. Within the pre-1967 borders of Israel, other Religious Zionists were found to have fomented violence and brutality against Arabs and, on occasion, against the Jewish left that supported Palestinian statehood. Although these acts of terror were routinely denounced by the National Religious Party and many religious leaders of Religious Zionism, there were other voices that provided religious sanction for such acts. Sometimes, the sanction was implicit as when the Chief Rabbi of Israel gave a eulogy at the funeral of Meir Kahane, founder of the extreme Kach movement who spoke of Palestinians as animals and advocated their forcible expulsion from all of Israel. Religious justification could also be explicit. When Israel began to move toward a comprehensive settlement with the Palestinians, raising the possibility of evacuating Jewish settlements in the Territories, some rabbis from the movement publicly urged observant soldiers to refrain from carrying out orders that violated God's intent. In a country where the non-political stance of the Army had become almost a religious article of faith, such an extreme statement signaled the destabilizing capacity of the conflict over the land.
The apotheosis of religious violence was reached on November 4, 1995 when Israel's Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, was assassinated by Yigal Amir. Far from being a loner or social outcast like many assassins, Amir was a product of the Religious Zionist youth movement, a parttime student in a Modern Orthodox yeshivah and a law student at Israel's orthodox university, Bar-Ilan. His rationale for killing Rabin was simple and chilling. Rabin was a traitor would was endangering Jewish lives by returning sacred land for an evanescent peace. Under Jewish law, Amir claimed, Rabin was a tyrant who deserved murder. In a chilling display of the logic of religious violence, he cited rabbinical warrant for his reasoning (Golinkin 1996) .
Israelis debated and continue to debate whether Amir was simply a deluded ultranationalist or if his actions in some way implicated Modern Orthodoxy. Did the assassination reveal that something was fundamentally wrong with Religious Zionism in the 1990s? Certainly, the sentiments that Amir articulated were not unique to the Modern Orthodox and were heard outside Religious Zionist circles. Many blamed Amir for the act but held Likud responsible for its incitement and extreme attacks upon the Labor-led peace process. But the stories reported by journalists also underlined the degree to which religion and land had become entangled in Orthodox discourse and suggested that Amir's actions were in some significant way the logical outgrowth of exposure to the growing extremism found in Religious Zionist circles (Horvitz 1995) . Despite calls for a candid reassessment of their political values and the need to educate Modern Orthodoxy about democratic values, the Rabin assassination seems only to have hardened views on both sides (Halevi 1998) . To much of the non-Orthodox Israeli public, who once viewed Religious Zionism as an ally in the Zionist enterprise, the non-haredi Orthodox have now become a major threat to the preservation of Israeli democracy.
The Rabin assassination underlines the fundamental danger to Israeli democracy of religious extremism. Ironically, the carrier of that sentiment was not the Ultraorthodox theocrats about whom so much has been written but the seemingly well-integrated and adjusted Modern Orthodox community. It is crucial to emphasize that this generalization is just that and should not be taken for an iron law. There are Ultraorthodox Jews who have joined the camp of territorial nationalism and many Religious Zionists have rejected the sacralization of land that has emerged within their community. But in the main, it is correct to identify territorial maximalism with the contemporary Religious Zionist movement and to note its limited appeal among the Ultraorthodox. The most widely-respected sage among haredim from North Africa issued a ruling at the time of Camp David that the Government was justified in exchanging territory for peace if doing so would save Jewish lives--the overriding value in halacha. In large measure because they do not venerate the state, the haredim have been much less agitated about questions of land and borders. This has led the Ultraorthodox parties--unlike the National Religious Party that still speaks for the territorial nationalism of Religious Zionism--to an essentially pragmatic position in foreign policy debates. If Israel is meant to occupy the whole of the ancient kingdom, God will see to it. If not, it is not a matter to occupy religious authority. With such an attitude, the Haredi parties have shown less concern for the global issues of war and peace that consume most other Israeli political movements.
Conclusion
This paper has reviewed the two major Israeli cleavages associated with religion and the question of Israel's Jewish character. The conflict over religion and state, associated largely with the Ultraorthodox community, is not generally likely to threaten the survival of the state. The debate over the sacred status of land, associated primarily with a wing of Modern Orthodoxy, has already shown itself much more portentous for the future of Israeli democracy.
These findings also speak to larger questions about the role of religion in political life. At the very least, the patterns apparent in the Israeli context suggest the need to distinguish carefully among varieties of what is usually called religious fundamentalism. In public discourse, "fundamentalism" is a unitary concept, a term that seems to describe high levels of religious enthusiasm or, in darker form, to denote a style of religious extremism that rejects compromise and accommodation with modernity. In this sense, argues Samuel Heilman (1994, 173) , fundamentalists are defined at base by "their believers' conviction (correct or not) that their religion as they practice it is part of an unbroken tradition beginning with the earliest prophets and practitioners of the faith and continuing into the contemporary present, linking all those who came before as well as those who shall come after and who remain true to the faith, in one great chain of religious being."
The Israeli case underlines the need to recognize the diversity within fundamentalism. When the construct of fundamentalism is applied to Israel, it usually denotes the first of the two cleavages we reviewed, the clash between the allegedly theocratic Ultraorthodox or haredim and the rest of the Israeli population. Consider that five of the six Jewish case studies in an authoritative volume devoted to global fundamentalism focused exclusively on the Ultraorthodox (Marty and Appleby 1994). When American Jewry discusses the issue of religious coercion in Israel, the images that recur are the "black hats" that symbolize the haredim. On some counts, the haredim certainly appear to fit the fundamentalist category. Most importantly, they claim to practice a pure form of Judaism, uncorrupted and eternal. However, if we understand fundamentalism to include the requirement that groups must in some way challenge and attempt to conquer their societies, then it seems less likely that the haredim fit the mold. In general, they have not confronted society unless it impinged on them. The customary response has been to retreat from Israeli society by forming insular enclaves.
Based on external appearances, the carriers of the second cleavage discussed above do not so readily seem to fit in the fundamentalist category. The Religious Zionists who have embraced territorial nationalism do not emulate the Ultraorthodox by attempting to seal themselves off from modernity. Rather, they seek to participate fully in contemporary society. Yet if they are not separatists who disdain modern culture, an implicit criteria of fundamentalism, they surely do meet the criteria in terms of their desire to remake Israel in a religious mold. They regard Israeli ownership of the entire Land of Israel not in self-interested terms, as a resource to be exploited, but as a precondition for the return of Israel to the ways of God. In that sense, they are much more likely than the haredim to act in the manner that we associate with fundamentalism.
This suggests that the fundamentalist label may be less useful than it first seems for characterizing important subgroups within Judaism. As Heilman suggests (1994, 176) , the characteristic mode of behavior by the Ultraorthodox, cultural isolation, might better be described as a form of religious traditionalism. The haredim attempt to preserve the past (as they understand it) by warding off the forces of change. This strategy maximizes the social distance between the Ultraorthodox and the less religious or irreligious sectors of the Israeli population. It is only when people "create the conditions to resist alternatives to [the past]," when they enter the activist stage of confrontation, that they warrant being described as fundamentalists. Despite their superficial similarities to those outside Orthodoxy, the Religious Zionists surely meet that standard more than the haredim. With that definition, we reinforce the conclusion that Israel faces two different types of religious challenges and that the movement for religious nationalism is by far the more daunting of the two cleavages.
1. In Judaism, religious intensity is measured by adherence to prescribed ritual behavior rather than acceptance of specified religious belief. Thus, the term "Orthodoxy" is used to describe Jews who follow a rigorous prayer regimen, engage in certain rituals, adhere to strict dietary guidelines, observe laws and customs relating to family purity, and otherwise comply with guidelines set down by Jewish tradition. Surveys of Israeli religious practice classify respondents into religious categories based either on their reported religious behavior or their self-description. For specifics, see Kedem (1991) . 3. For a useful summary of the debate over the size of Israel's Arab sector at independence, see Appendix I in Morris (1987) .
4. In the immediate aftermath of the War of Independence (known as The Great Catastrophe to Palestinians), Arabs who remained, thought to be a security risk, were placed under a military regime that severely curtailed such basic rights as travel, land ownership, communication and political organizing (Lustick 1980) . 5. The flashpoint usually involves the Temple Mount, the highest point in the old city of Jerusalem and site of the first and second Temples of the ancient Hebrew kingdoms (Halevi 1996) . Since the seventh century, it has housed the Dome of the Rock, holy to Islam as the site where Mohammed began his night journey to heaven, and the sacred Al-Aqsa mosque. Upon Israel's conquest of the Old City in 1967, the government reaffirmed exclusive Moslem rights to the site while claiming for Israel the supporting Western Wall beneath it. Periodic attempts by Jewish extremists to reclaim the Mount have inflamed Muslims and led to violent clashes with police. While I would not discount the religious feelings involved on both sides, I think this conflict has less to do with the intrinsic religious values attached to the Temple Mount than to the manner in which it symbolizes national autonomy. This is certainly true on the Jewish side where Orthodox authorities have long prohibited Jews from walking on the Mount lest they inadvertently step on consecrated ground from the Temple period.
6. I will italicize the Hebrew word on first usage and use normal fonts in subsequent references.
Notes.
This is a preliminary version of a chapter to appear in Ted G. Jelen and Clyde C. Wilcox, eds., The One, The Few and the Many: Religion and Politics in Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press).
7. To secular eyes, the qualities that unite the Ultraorthodox world are more compelling than the issues that divide them. Signifying that perception, casual observers sometimes equate subgroups of haredim, such as the Hasidic sects, with the whole. In practice, the haredim are divided over a wide range of religious questions, over the degree to which they should engage the outside world, and by severe ethnic cleavages.
8. There is a less violent version of this argument, expressed by Pinchas Hayman (1995) in the pages of the Jerusalem Post. According to Hayman, who teaches at the orthodox Bar-Ilan University, the concept of a Jewish nation means that Israeli citizenship is the exclusive preserve of Jews and hence that "we have every right to exclude non-Jews from the body politic (while seeing to their social, medical, educational and other needs). Such a perspective, while distant from the crude calls for genocide against the Palestinians, clearly warrants treating them as subjects with lesser rights than Jews. For a balanced discussion of the constitutional dilemmas posed by Israel's Jewish self-identification, see Peled (1992) .
